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Abstract
This paper describes a study conducted within a naturalistic decision making
paradigm in which a disruptive passenger threatens the safety of a hypothetical
flight. Sixty-five professional members of flight crew participated in a series of
semi-structured interviews during which they described their decision-making
process for dealing with this situation. An artificial neural network was used to
model the decisions made on the basis of the situation assessment activities
undertaken to produce an empirically verihable model of the participants' decision-
making process. Cross-validation of the results showed that decision outcomes
could be very accurately predicted on the basis of this model. It is suggested that
neural networks may be a viable way of modelling naturalistic decisions.
Introduction
Flying a modern, highly automated civil aircraft is no longer simply a problem of
skilled psychomotor performance but is one of flight management and real-time
decision-making. Fortunately, many of the decisions that are required of flight
crew are routine, well structured and quite familiar. However, the crew will also
Conespondence: Don Harris, Human Factors Group, College of Aeronautics, Cranfield
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be required to solve less-routine problems. Decision-making is not a simple task:
it involves situation assessment, choice amongst altematives and assessment of
risk (Orasanu, 1993).
Many non-routine problems are quite simple or can be solved by reference to
checklists carried on the flight deck. These serve as essential aids for the
management of the majority of in-flight technical failures encountered. However,
the vast majority problems do not relate to equipment malfunctions. The sources
of these problems are often external to the flight deck. The information about the
cause of these problems is usually incomplete and/or probabilistic and the
problems themselves are ill structured. Often there is no readily identifiable
'correct' solution, only satisfactory and less-satisfactory outcomes. Furthermore,
the quality of many of these outcomes can only be described in reÍospect.
When subject to even the most cursory analysis, it can be seen that the types of
decision often required of flight crew are quite different to the problem solving
scenarios encountered by participants in laboratory-based research. Much
laboratory-based research has been couched within the classical decision-making
(CDM) experimental paradigm, which itself has its roots in economic theory
(Lehto, 1997). From a historical perspective, two major approaches within CDM
research emerged: the 'preference and choice' approach and the 'statistical
inference' approach, however both were based, either directly or indirectly, on
formal logic and probability theory. In these types of study participants were
often placed in a highly artificial situation attempting to solve a relatively simple,
well structured problem with the benefit of being in possession of complete
information. Often the decision required of them was simply the choice between
several pre-determined altematives. Nevertheless, the results of such experiments
could be quantified and subject to statistical analysis. However, as a result of the
methods by which these studies were undertaken to generate such data, the CDM
paradigm was criticised as being a poor description of everyday decision-making
and especially ofdecision-making on the flight deck. Later researchers have also
criticised these approaches as focussing simply on the decision event and not the
decisional process (Orasanu and Connolly, 1993).
As a result of these shortcomings of CDM theory, naturalistic decision-making
(NDM) has become the dominant paradigm to describe pilot problem-solving
behaviour. NDM recognises that the manner in which humans make decisions in
the laboratory and in real life is quite different. Orasanu (1993) observed that
decisions in the aviation domain are particularly well-suited to study using an
NDM approach as they tend to be ill-structured and set in a dynamic, time-
pressured environment where the consequences ofa poor decision can be dire. In
many cases there can be conflicting or competing goals (for example the trade-off
between safety and efficiency) which may be the product of personal biases or
organisational values. Furthermore, in aviation, a decision is not an end in itself;
it is merely often just the pre-cursor to another decision. Finally, there is more
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than a single individual contributing to or implicated in most decisions taken
(Orasanu and Connolly, 1993).
The context and quality of information have major influences on the manner in
which a problem is approached in the 'real world'. The cognitive processes
employed by the decision-maker in these situations are vastly different to those by
which it is infened people make a decision within the CDM paradigm. Exactly
how these two paradigms differ depends upon the author and CDMÀ{DM model
proposed. CDM models tend to favour an approach where several alternatives are
evaluated in parallel by the decision maker (encompassing their own biases). The
one with the greatest perceived chance of success or highest perceived utility is
finally selected (e.g. minimax decision making models, subjective expected utility
models or multi-attribute utility models 
- 
see Lehto, 1997 for an overview). NDM
approaches suggest that after a brief period of situation assessment, a course of
action is chosen that will potentially produce a satisfactory outcome. For
example, Klein (1989) suggests that if a situation is not immediately recognised,
the decision-maker mentally rehearses what the likely effect of certain actions will
be. These options are then evaluated serially. Once a satisfactory outcome is
thought likely on the basis of this cognitive activity, that course of action is
pursued. This general approach to decision-making is also evident in other NDM
models (e.g. Connolly, 1988; Montgomery, 1989).
While NDM theory has contributed greatly to understanding the decision-
making processes in real-world situations it has had critics who have pointed out
some of its limitations (e.g. Howell, 1997). Perhaps its greatest shortcoming lies
in the analytical methods employed. The majority of NDM models have been
developed qualitatively from observation and analysis of experts' decision-making
processes. However, in common with most qualitative research, NDM's biggest
strength is also its greatest weakness. The rich description of the decision-making
process almost precludes any element of quantification or prediction. However,
for NDM models to be accepted, they must be empirically testable, hence they
need to be embedded within a theory. They need to offer predictions about
outcomes (decisions) on the basis of context and information (see Hammond,
1993). A testable model can also be replicated and the bounds of its
generalisability established. The method for the quantification of parameters and
their analysis in CDM allows for such things, however, NDM models do not. At
the moment they are descriptive rather than predictive.
Conventional statistical analytical techniques, either univariate or multivariate,
cannot deal with the complexities and richness of the NDM process, where many
inputs may simultaneously result in many outputs. 'Conventional' statistics cannot
cope with complex branching of logical conditions and cannot provide a tool to
model the complex relationships between inputs and outputs, which could be
taken as reflecting the decision-making process. 'Conventional' statistics can only
cope with additive andlor multiplicative relationships between predictor and
criterion variables (or in the terms of decision making, inputs and outputs). It is
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also difficult to predict more than a single criterion variable and under no
circumstances is logical branching allowed within an analysis. One technique for
data analysis can cope with these complexities, though: neural networks.
Neural networks (NNs) are emerging as a technique within the social sciences
to describe and model complex problems (Hair, Anderson, Tatham and Black,
1998; Garson, 1998). NNs allow the simultaneous prediction of many outcomes
from many inputs and allow models to be developed which implicitly include
complex 'if...then' expressions. They are particularly well suited to applications
with noisy, missing, overlapping, non-linear and non-continuous data (Moore,
1998) and can also handle highly unstructured data. NNs do not, however,
provide for probabilistic 'goodness-of-fit' tests of the models developed (c/
structural equation modelling) nor do they allow for statistical tests of difference.
Nevertheless, they do potentially provide a way of building an empirically
describable and verifiable model of the relationship between inputs and outputs.
Perhaps as important for the purposes of NDM is the observation made by Haykin
(1994) that NNs also allow for contextual information to be incorporated into a
model. This model-building approach implicit in NN analysis also reflects an
emerging trend in psychology and human factors which is away from statistical
tests of difference and toward developing process-engineering types of models of
human behaviour (Moray, 1999). Dowell, Smith and Pidgeon, (1997) have also
suggested that NDM should be viewed as an engineering process.
Leven and Levine (1996) argue that NNs are more than just computational
devices and that they can provide a basis for explaining multi-attribute decision-
making. In the past there has been conflict within decision science, between
quantitative (CDM) and NDM approaches. NDM studies have lacked
mathematical and theoretical foundations, whereas quantitative approaches have
neglected less easily quantifiable factors.that are important in the decision making
process. Leven and Levine (1996) showed that the NN approach can encapsulate
both CDM and NDM approaches.
NNs are based upon a simplified model of the hypothesised manner in which
the brain operates. The most common form of artificial NN is the multi-layer
perceptron (simplified elements of which are illustrated in f,rgure l). The basic
processing unit in a NN is the node. A NN contains many nodes, some of which
represent input values and some of which represent output values, plus often a
middle ('hidden') layer. It is the nodes in the hidden layer that allows
relationships to be more complex than simple one-to-one relationships between
input and output. Each node is a self-contained unit that acts in parallel with other
nodes. Every connection between nodes has a weight (co) that is applied to the
incoming data. Each node then creates a summated value of these products, to
which is applied an activation function which creates the output value from the
node. The activation function usually takes the form of a simple function which
dictates that the output ofa node is ofthe binary form 'fire' (produce an output) or
'inhibit' (no output).
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Figure 1 Elements of the multi-layer perceptron type of NN (adapted from
Hair, Anderson, Tatham and Black, 1998; and Garson' 1998)
The essential feature of NNs is that they learn the relationship(s) between
inputs and outputs (or in the current application 'information' and 'decisions') and
self-correct. All NN applications require two sets of data, a set for supervised
leaming, where the outcomes are known and a cross validation data set to test the
model derived. In the supervised learning set, the model commences with a 'best
guess' and applies a set of weights. Predicted outputs are compared with actual,
known outputs and the weights in the model are corrected to reflect the sign and
magnitude of the error observed. This continues iteratively until the overall error
rate falls below some pre-defined criterion. The model is then applied to the input
data from the cross-validation data set and the output predictions from the NN are
compared to the actual outputs. In this way the NN model is validated.
Garson (1998) describes many studies that demonstrate the successful
application of NNs, many of which are models for making economic decisions
and predictions (cf. early CDM models). In particular, he suggests NNs are well
suited to pattern-matching applications. As alluded to earlier, the first aspect of
any decision-making task is that of situation assessment. Situation assessment is
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itself a precursor for situation awareness which in turn is the precursor for all
decision-making (Lipshitz, 1993; Nobel, 1993; Prince and Salas, 1997). The
NDM models proposed by Hammond (1988), Klein (1989) and Nobel (1993) are
all essentially pattern-matching models of decision-making, (although it is
arguable if Hammond's work can actually be considered part of the NDM
paradigm; it is, however, strongly related to these other NDM models in its
approach). Nobel (1993) particularly emphasises role of situation assessment. In
these NDM models, information is gathered about the situation and compared
with mental models (reference problems) of similar situations held in long-term
memory. These may be formulated from actual experience or vicariously through
such methods as formal training or informal discussions with colleagues. These
situation assessment and subsequent, cognitive pattem-matching activities form
the basis for the subsequent decisions and actions taken. It would thus seem that
NNs might provide a method by which an empirically verifiable model of
situation assessment and NDM may be constructed. This paper tests this assertion
by modelling the decision-making processes of pilots responding to a
(hypothetical)'air rage' (disruptive passenger) incident.
Method
Scenario requirements and development
An unstructured problem scenario with indirect, incomplete and inferential
information was developed. The scenario developed had to be suitable for
adrninistration to flight crew using a semi-structured telephone interview in order
to gain a large sample with diverse experience from a geographically widely-
dispersed population and within a reasonable time frame. It also had to have no
prescribed 'correct' solution. The scenario must not involve a well-defined course
of action prescribed by such flight deck items as the checklists in the quick
reference handbook. As a result of these criteria, interviewees would be required
to make a decision based upon only their assessment of the situation.
The scenario chosen was an 'air rage' scenario. This was selected for several
reasons. Firstly, while many airlines promulgate guidelines and advice to their
pilots about prospective courses of action to take when there is an unruly passenger
in the aircabin, there are no set checklists to follow in such circumstances.
Secondly, the interviewee would require no instrument readings or air traffic
control instructions. The information the interviewee would receive over the
telephone from the interviewer would be similar in content and mode of
communication as that they would receive from the cabin crew in an actual incident.
'Air rage', or disruptive passenger behaviour has become an issue of increasing
concem for aviation safety in the late 1990s. The UK Flight Safety committee
(1998) suggested that up to 6,000 disruptive passenger incidents might occur
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every year on UK-registered aircraft. Not all lead to a prosecution, however in the
l2-month period ending March 1998, British Airways reported 266 incidents
(Jack, 1998). In a similar period United Airlines reported 450 incidents
(Longmuir, 1998). American Airlines reported a 200Yo increase in disruptive
passenger behaviour between 1994 and 1995 (Hicks and Morrison, 1997). These
incidents can compromise the safety of the aircraft and the crew themselves.
Cabin crew have been attacked by passengers with broken bottles and in July
1999, a pilot on a Japanese Airlines aircraft was stabbed to death when a
passenger broke into the flight deck. On other occasions disruptive passengers
attempting to open doors or overwing emergency exits during flight have
compromised the safety of everyone on the aircraft. In response, in 1995 the UK
Air Navigation Order was revised (and further revised in 1999) to make it an
offence to intentionally interfere with the duties of cabin crew. This is now
punishable by up to two years imprisonment; endangering the safety of an aircraft
carries a maximum sentence of five years.
When faced with a disruptive passenger incident the Commander of the aircraft
has various choices. SÁre can elect simply to attempt to diffuse the situation; they
can have the passenger physically restrained and/or they can make an immediate
diversion to the nearest suitable airfield ifthey believe that there is any danger to
passengers, crew or the aircraft itself. In the latter case, the costs incurred may be
recovered from the passengers responsible.
The interview scenario was developed with the aid of two senior training
captains from a major international airline both of whom had experienced in-flight
incidents involving a disruptive passenger and also a senior member of cabin
crew. The scenario and interview protocol was subject to several iterations using
a further flight crew before commencing the study proper.
Participants
All participants were recruited from the Cranfield University volunteer pilot panel.
All interviewees were in possession of a full UK Airline Transport Pilot's Licence
and were flying heavy passenger-carrying, commercial transport aircraft at the
time of the study. In total, 65 participants were interviewed.
Scenario
All interviewees were presented with the following information. They were told
that they were flight crew on a four-hour flight from airport A to airport B. The
aircraft was flying over a country in mainland, Western Europe. Prior to take-off
there had been a minor technical problem with the aircraft that had delayed
departure. Many passengers were unhappy about this delay and several had been
drinking. On this particular flight there was an all-female cabin crew compliment.
The 'air rage' incident commenced about halfivay through the flight. At the time
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of the incident there was a diversionary airport available (airport C),
approximately 30 minutes flying time away. Facilities at airport C for passenger
handling were rudimentary, however, due to poor weather in the vicinity, it was
the only airport with a suitably equipped runway of adequate length available.
The remainder of the scenario was as follows, however, this information was not
volunteered to the interviewee unless it was specihcally asked for. The disruptive
passenger was a moderately large man, travelling as part of a larger group of
passengers. He was deemed to have become abusive toward the cabin crew after
having (apparently) consumed alarge amount of alcohol. He was not on medication.
Procedure
The interviewee was contacted prior to the telephone interview to establish if they
were willing to participate in the study. If they indicated that they were willing to
do so, they were telephoned on a later occasion at a mutually agreed time.
The interviewer gave a brief overview of the purposes of the study before
commencing the interview. Demographic details for each interviewee (age, sex,
rank, flying experience, type-ratings etc.) were available from the Cranfield
University volunteer pilot panel database. The agreement of the interviewee to
record the interview was also elicited at this time.
The interviewee was given the initial scenario information described in the
previous sub-section. They were asked what actions they would take to assess the
situation (i.e. to gather information) and what decisions they would make about
actions to control the situation. To obtain the information described in the latter
part of the scenario participants had to specifically ask for it. If they asked a
question that required information not contained within the scenario, the
interviewer, who was essentially playing the part of the Purser reporting the
incident to the flight deck, replied that she did not know. To help the interviewer
maintain consistency in her responses, a scenario 'flow diagram' was available to
her at all the times during the interview with all the explicitly 'known' information
about the passenger and the incident on it. The interviewer only prompted for
clarification of certain points or actions when required.
Interviews typically lasted between five and 15 minutes. At the end the
interviewee was asked if they had any questions and thanked for their time.
Results
Samp le characteristics
In the final sample, 6l interviewees were male and four were female. Twenty
were First Officers and 45 were Captains. All interviewees were in possession of
a full UK ATPL (Airline Transport Pilots Licence) at the time of the study. Mean
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flying experience (in years) was 20.3 (with a standard deviation of 11.3 years):
mean flight experience (in hours) was 9,027.7 hours (standard deviation of
6,069.1).
Treatment of data
Subsequent to the interviews the content of the transcripts was categorised into
either 'situation assessment' variables (where the interviewee had actively alluded
to either searching for information or procuring information about the situation by
other means) or'subsequent actions/decisions' aimed at dealing with the situation.
Various sub-categories within each of these broad categories were further
identified from content analysis of the interview transcripts. This coding
framework encompassed all the 'situation assessment' activities and
'action/decisions' made by the interviewees. The researchers independently
verified the existence of these categories within the data set.
The contents of the interview transcripts from each participant were then re-
categorised using the coding framework derived. The pilot's reports were coded
for containing evidence ofhaving acquired (or not acquired) a certain element of
information from their information seeking activities or having made (or not
made) a certain decision subsequent to these actions. The coding of the interview
transcripts into this framework was subject to cross checking by the researchers.
Table 1 contains a description of the categories elicited from the interviews and
their frequencies of occurrence within the data set.
Initial qualitative analysis and discussíon of the data
It can be seen from figure 2 that the vast majority of pilots interviewed (72.3%)
suggested they would acquire situation assessment information from multiple
sources before making their decision and implementing their actions. However,
relatively few pilots would elect to obtain situation assessment information from
more than three sources. The results in table I suggest that the most frequent
situation assessment activity undertaken was to get a full description of the
situation from the cabin crew. Just over one-quarter of all in the interviewees said
that they would send the other pilot back to the aircabin to appraise the situation
even though many company's operating procedures strongly suggest that it is
undesirable to leave a solitary member of crew on the flight deck in such
circumstances. The two approaches tended to be mutually exclusive, which
suggests that there may be either a whole-crew-based approach to ddaling with the
problem or a flight deck-based approach. Although it is not directly evident from
the results presented (as this would require presenting an extremely large multi-
way contingency table) only in eight cases did the decision-maker gather
information both from the cabin crew and also send a pilot back to investigate.
Interestingly, in five of these eight cases, it was established that the passenger was
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a large man. Given that there was an all-female cabin crew compliment on board,
this action is perhaps not too surprising. If it was established that there were off-
duty crew on board (a piece of information solicited in approximately one-quarter
of all instances) it was unlikely that a member of flight deck crew would be sent to
investigate (this only happened on five out ofapossible l7 occasions). In four out
of the six occasions that it was established that the passenger was a large man, the
interviewee also appraised the facilities at the diversionary airport! This option to
divert was also frequently associated (11 out of 15 occasions) when the pilot did
not investigate if there were other off duty crew travelling.
Numbe r of Situation Assessment lnformation
Sources Used
Number of Decision Actions Taken
Figure 2 Frequency distributions for the number of situation assessment
activities undertaken by interviewees and the number of
subsequent actions implemented on the basis of the decisions made
Simple apparent associations between input variables are reasonably easy to
identifr using a multi-way contingency table as long as the data set is not too large
or is it desired to look at the associations only between two or three variables.
However, it becomes more difficult to identify relationships such as the last one in
the previous paragraph, where the presence of one situation assessment variable is
apparently associated with the absence of another. The problem becomes even
greater where it is desired to establish associations between many situation
assessment variables (input nodes) and subsequent decisions. In these cases not
gathering situation assessment information may be equally as important in
c
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determining a decision as actually gathering data. It can also be seen from figure
I that only in very few cases would a pilot follow a single course of action on the
basis of their assessment of the situation.
Table I Frequency of situation assessment actions (input nodes) and
subsequent decisions and actions (output nodes) derived from the
interview transcripts
Situation assessment actions n
(input nodes) (%) Subsequent decisions/ nactions (output nodes) &)
Establish if the passenger is
travelling alone
Get a full description of the
situation from the cabin crew
Send a pilot back to the
aircabin to appraise the
situation
Appraise facilities at nearer,
alternate airport (airport C)
Establish ifthere are any ofÊ
duty crew travelling that may
help
Collect personal details about
the passenger
Establish if he is a large man
Establish if he is on
medication
Appraise the facilities in the
country being overflown for
dealing with the problem
Ascertain if there were any
problems prior to boarding
Get a summary of the problem
from the disruptive passenger
l5 Organise police at destination 26(23.l) airport (40.0)
15 Make a general warning on the 19
(23.1) public address system (29.2)
47 Get friends or other able-
(72.3) bodied passenger to help
25 Issue a specific warning to the
(38.5) disruptive passenger
17 Contact the company
(26.2)
7 Divert to nearer alternate
(10.8) airport (airport C)
6 Refuse to serve any more(9.2) alcohol
6 Physically restrain the(9.2) passenger
6 Move him away from other(9.2) passengers
5
(7.7)
4
(6.2)
47
(72.3)
44
(67.7)
27
(41.6)
l7
(26.2)
9
(13.8)
9
( 13.8)
4
(6.2)
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Not too surprisingly the most common courses of action were enlisting the help
of the passenger's friends or other able bodied people on the aircraft and issuing a
formal waming (see table l). On 30 occasions, the former of these decisions was
made when the interviewee had previously sought to establish if the passenger was
travelling alone and/or if they had any off-duty crew in the aircabin, which is logical.
Issuing a waming was not strongly related to any one situation assessment variable.
Interestingly, the decision to divert to airport C was not highly related to
appraising the facilities there beforehand. However, it was noticeable from the
data that pilots who elected to divert collected far less situation assessment data
than those who continued on to their final destination (on average they obtained
information from L9 sources versus the pilots who elected to carry on, who
collected information from 2.7 sources). A similar but less pronounced pattem
was observed with pilots who would elect to restrain the passenger. They also
gathered less situation assessment in formatíon (2.2 versus 2.5 sources
investigated). Only in one case did an interviewee elect to restrain the disruptive
passenger and divert. It would seem that these options are almost mutually
exclusive. In all cases where the disruptive passenger was either restrained or the
pilot elected to divert, the police at the arrival airport were notified. It would seem
that the more extreme methods for dealing with the 'air rage' incident are taken on
the basis of the least situation assessment information. These data suggest that in
these cases the pilot seem to decide that'they have seen enough' and rapidly make
a 'conservative' (or 'safe') decision on how to deal with the situation.
NN analysis and interpretatíon of the data set
Having coded all 65 interview transcripts in the manner described in the earlier
section describing the treatment of the raw data, the data set was randomly split
into two portions of approximately two-third and one-thirds. The larger set of 42
cases was used as the training set for the neural network; the smaller set of 23 cases
was used as the data set to cross validate the solution derived (see Garson, 1998).
The data set was then entered into the binary version of the NN analysis
programme NeuroshellrM (1990). This version is specifically designed for the
analysis of binary, categorical data. Neuroshell is based on the multilayer
perceptron and utilises a back-propagation method for controlling the learning rate
and assessing the convergence of the NN model.
The 'situation assessment' variables were used as the input variables (nodes) to
the model and 'subsequent actions/decisions' were used as the output nodes. Five
cases were deleted from the analysis as their pattem of input variables exactly
duplicated that of another case in the training set. The software user manual
(Neuroshell, 1990) suggests that the deletion of duplicate cases is likely to
produce a better final solution.
Nine nodes were used in the 'hidden layer' based on the formula for the
estimation of the optimum number of hidden nodes suggested in the user manual
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(Neuroshell, 1990). This is double the square root of the number of input nodes
plus the number of output nodes. This number is also well within the maximum
number of hidden nodes suggested by Garson (1998), which is half the number of
cases in the training data set. Too few hidden nodes and the solution will fail to
converge; too many and the solution produced tends to overfït the training data set
(i.e. the answer produced will be specific to the training data set and will not
generalise to the cross validation data set: in this latter case, the correct
classification rate for these cases will be poor). The NN model converged using
just these nine hidden nodes with all cases having an eÍïor of <0.05. The total
error rate (error sum ofsquares) was 0.59.
Table 2 Weights from the situation assessment variables (input nodes) to
the hidden nodes and their associated activation functions (biases),
for the NN model derived from the derivation set of data
Situation assessment actions \ileight to hidden node nurnber:-
23456789(input nodes)
Bias 7.4
Establish ifthe passenger is
travelling alone
Send a pilot back to the aircabin
to appraise the situation
Establish if there are any ofÊduty
crew travelling that may help
Get a full description of the
situation from the cabin crew
Get a summary of the problem
from the disruptive passenger
Appraise facilities at nearer,
altemate airport (airport C)
Ascertain if there were any
problems prior to boarding
Establish if he is a large man
Establish if he is on medication
Collect personal details about the
passenger
Appraise the facilities in the
country being overflown
t9.1 12.6 -7.9 9.4 11.2 2.3 -3.2 2.3
-9.0 -6.5 6.0 13.2 tr.1 6.9 2.6 0.2
5.1 -21.0 -4.0 2.4 -7.8 -6.2 2.8 -1.8
-3.0 6.4 7.8 8.1 -18.2 -8.8 -5.1 0.3
-9.9 13.9 2.2 15.6 -4.5 -5.0 -5.4 2.4
-3.7
8.1
-2.9
-23.0
16.2
-4.0
-27.3
13.4
-1.5 -17.2 12.3 t5.6 0.8
10.3 -13.1 21.8 4.7 8.4
-1 l.l 19.8 5.4 -16.7 6.4
-1.9 -3.2 -2.7
7.1 -4.0 -2.3
2.4 -1.5 4.2
-0.2
-2.2 0.1 24.7 -fi.0 -8.7 -1.0 5.3 -7.6 3.7
-5.8 0.0 1.0 -9.6 -t2.9 -1.9 -2.3 2.9 0.5
t__
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The figures in table 2 correspond to the weights on the paths from the input
nodes to the hidden nodes (as described in figure l). As the input nodes were of a
binary format, coded 'l' for gathering situation assessment information and '0' for
not doing so, the weight also represents that path's contribution to making a
hidden node fire (or not). A large positive weight will encourage a hidden node to
fire: a large negative weight will help inhibit the node. The biases (calculated by
the NN program) represents the threshold above which hidden node will fire.
Table 3 Weights from the hidden nodes to the and 'subsequent
actions/decisions' variables (output nodes) and their associated
activation functions (biases), for the NN model derived from the
derivation set of data
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The hidden nodes also produce a binary output. Table 3 shows the connection
weights between the hidden nodes and the output nodes (decisions and actions
taken). As the output from the hidden nodes is also binary, the weights are again
essentially the contribution to making an output node 'ftre'.
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Table 4 Frequency and percentage of 'subsequent actions/decisions'
variables (output nodes) categorised as being either correct or
incorrect in the cross validation data set
Subsequent actions/decisions
(Output nodes)
Correctly
Classified
Incorrectly
Classified
Hits Correct Misses False
reiections alarms
Get friends or other able-bodied
passenger to help
Move him away from other passengers
Refuse to serve any more alcohol
Contact the company
Organise police at destination airport
Make a general warning on the public
address system
Issue a specific warning to the
disruptive passenger
Physically restrain the passenger
Divert to nearer alternate airport
(airpot C)
When analysing the veracity of the predictions made by the NN model a signal-
detection theory-based approach was used. The predictions made for each output
node (decision) in the cross-validation data set were categorised as 'hits' (correct
predictions of actions taken); 'misses' (action taken but NN predicted that this
category of action would not be taken); 'false alarms' (where it was predicted that
an action would be taken but actually it was not taken); and correct rejections
(predictions that a category of action would not be taken which was proven to be
correct).
As can be seen in table 4, the NN described in tables 2 and 3 produced a l00Vo
correct classification rate for all the output variables (decisions) based upon the
20
22
22
l5
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input variables (situation assessment information). There were no 'misses' or
'false alarms' for any output variable.
Discussion
No previous study has examined the decision-making of commercial pilots in a
disruptive passenger incident. The discussion of the interviewees' situation
assessment activities and subsequent actions in the hypothetical disruptive
passenger incident has already been presented the previous section describing the
qualitative analysis of the data gathered. The emphasis in this section will be on
assessing the utility of artificial NNs for the modelling of NDM. To re-iterate, as
the study was conducted within an NDM paradigm the interviewees were
restricted in neither the sources of information that they could interrogate to assess
the situation nor in the number or type of actions that they could pursue as a result
of the information gathered. A certain degree of artificiality has been introduced
into the study through the subsequent content analysis and coding of the interview
transcript data to prepare it for analysis using the NN shell, however, as far as
possible, it has been attempted to maintain this analysis within the NDM tradition.
Before proceeding any further it is worth issuing a word of warning about the
evaluation of the results from a NN. While it may be tempting to infer cause and
effect relationships between situation assessment variables and decisions (as in the
description of selected results in the previous section) the interpretation of
individual variables in a NN should be approached with caution. The neural model
as a whole should be interpreted for its efficacy in predicting outcomes rather than
interpreting the contribution of individual variables. In this instance the NN
correctly predicted 100% ofall the decisions for each ofthe nine output variables
that each pilot in the cross-validation data set actually made' This is
extraordinarily high and is uncommon even for a neural network'
Some insight may be gained about the manner in which a given situation
assessment NN input variable affects a subsequent decision by studying the
weights to and from the relevant hidden nodes. However, it again needs to be
emphasised that variables can only be evaluated in the context of the other
variables and their stated relationships. The value in an NN lies in the model as a
whole, not its individual components or specific relationships within it. In this
case it would be wrong to suggest that one input (situation assessment) variable is
more important than another in determining the final course(s) of action chosen
(cf. the weights in multiple regression). The following description merely
describes the manner in which a variable operates with a NN.
Consider the weights to the hidden nodes from the situation assessment variable
appraising facilities available at airport C. If this situation assessment activity was
made, the input node took a value of unity. This value is then multiplied by the
various weights to each of the hidden nodes. Its effect begins to spread
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throughout the NN. The sums of all the weights from each input variable
(situation assessment) variable are computed at each hidden node. If the sum of
the input functions to the hidden node exceeds a critical value (essentially the bias
in this case as thresholds were set to 0.01) the node 'fires' and an output from the
hidden node is made. For simplicity, only the larger weights in this illustration
will be considered. From the node associated with the pilot appraising the
facilities available at the diversionary airport, it can be seen that this input variable
will help to activate hidden nodes 1,4 and 5, and suppress (inhibit from firing)
hidden node 3 (see table 2). From table 3 the influence of hidden node 4 (for
example) can be established on the outcome (decision) variables. Taking just the
larger weights associated with this node to illustrate further this principle, this
element will help 'fire' the output variable that suggests the pilot will organise the
police at airport C pilot but will simultaneously help suppress the firing of the
output node suggesting that the pilot will call for the passenger to be physically
restrained.
While the above explanation gives some insight into how the inputs, hidden
nodes and outputs in the NN operate it is essential that only the overall results
should be interpreted, not individual paths between nodes. The NN is as good as
the combined effect of its components. The greatest problem faced by the
researcher lies in the interpretation and evaluation of NN models. The efficacy of
a model can only be evaluated in its ability to predict accurately outcomes. In this
case the evaluation of the accuracy with which each output (decision) variable was
predicted was evaluated using a signal detection theory based approach. This
allowed the nature of any misclassification of a variable (as a 'miss' or a 'false
alarm') to be identified.
The adequacy of the input variables to the NN is a little harder to assess,
however, a poor input variable (one that makes little or no contribution toward
predicting the NN output values) will adversely affect the whole of the network.
In the instance of including a poor input node into a NN model it is likely that
either the solution will not converge or that the predictions made by the model
will be inaccurate upon cross validation. Unfortunately, there is no other way to
identifr poor input nodes other than by trial and error. The extremely high conect
classification rate ofthe decisional outcomes in the cross-validation data set (see
table 4) would suggest that the situation assessment variables elicited in the
interviews, taken as a set, are good predictors of the decisions a pilot will make
when dealing with a disruptive passenger, once the NN model described in tables
2 and3 is applied.
The main issues in a NN such as the one produced in this study are basically
concerned with the content and the criterion validity of the model produced. The
criterion (predictive) validity is relatively easy to establish through the use ofthe
signal detection theory based approach described previously. The greatest
challenge lies in assessing the content validity of the NN model. In this case the
question of content validity applies to both situation assessment inputs and
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decision/action outputs of the NN model. Kerlinger (1973) suggests the
researcher should askthemselves the question'is the substance or content of this
measure representative of the universe of content of the property being
measured?' (p. 458). In the case of the NN modeller it is essential to establish if
the input and output nodes (situation assessment and decisions/actions) are an
exhaustive set of all the pieces of information that the decision maker would
interrogate and a reasonably representative set ofthe universe ofpossible (likely)
subsequent actions. It should be noted that at any one point in time a human being
actually has an almost infinite number of possible behaviours open to them (some
are more likely thank others, though)! As a result it is not possible to define the
entire universe of behaviours on the output side of the model. Content validity
can never be totally established. It can only be reasonably assured by employing
appropriate data gathering and analytical methodologies. In this case it has been
attempted to ensure content validity by employing a reasonably large sample of
suitably qualihed pilots with a range of experience and by employing a daÍa
gathering technique commensurate with the NDM paradigm.
The present study does, however, have some shortcomings in that it was not
conducted within the context of either a flight deck or a real 'air rage' incident.
Context, time pressures and multiple actors are important aspects of decision
making, as recognised by many NDM theorists (e.g. Klein, 1989; Orasanu 1993;
Orasanu and Connolly, 1993). While the study presented the information to the
interviewee in a manner similar to the way it would be presented in a real incident,
some other aspects of the situation were different. For example, the interviewee
did not have the opportunity to discuss options with other colleagues on the flight
deck and the time-scale for the interview did not reflect the time-scale of an actual
incident. All the sources of situation assessment information and the decisions
subsequently made were proffered in a short period of time. The opportunities for
collecting information, implementing a decision and monitoring the situation, as
would be done in a real-life situation, were limited. However, the methodology
employed was not all that different to that employed in many other NDM studies
which have utilised retrospective introspection about the manner in which a
decision was reached and were necessary given the methodology employed.
This study does strongly suggest, though, that the use of an artificial NN may
be a way of empirically modelling NDM. NNs have been used with success in
similar applications in the past, although not with such a high coÍrect classification
rate on the cross-validation sample. This may be an artefact of only a relatively
small number of input and/or output variables being used in the final model.
Models that have greater numbers of situation assessment variables and decisional
outcomes may show a lower correct classification rate on cross validation. This
requires further investigation. The 'richness' and 'complexity' of the NNs
produced by pilots of different levels of experience may provide some insight into
the key factors in the decision making process. Cellier, Eyrolle and Marine
(1997), in an overview of expertise in decision making in dynamic environments
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observed that novice and expert representations of systems differed considerably.
In some instances experts had a far more complex internal representation of the
system than the novices did and in other instances quite the opposite was true.
Experts had a far simpler, functional representation. It is possible that these
representations of system complexity could be reflected in the NNs produced by
experts and novices. This approach may be well woÍh considering to help
validate the use of NNs as an approach for the modelling of naturalistic decisions.
Despite the need for considerably more work to evaluate the utility of using
NNs, to model naturalistic decisions the present work has demonstrated that
multiple decisional outcomes can be accurately predicted from a model based
upon multiple sources of situation assessment information. The question remains,
however, if NNs can be used for other categories of NDM tasks other than what is
essentially a pattern-matching decision making task, for example 'consequential
choice' and 'reassessment' type NDM tasks (Lipshitz, 1993). However, in the
present safety-related scenario, the model has performed commendably in
predicting the decisions made in an unstructured situation.
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